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Since the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000, there has been an ongoing debate around the 
long-term viability of Internet-specific business models. Quick IPOs with lacking 
profitability and high failure rates have put many investors off in the aftermath of the crisis. 
In this thesis, I therefore analyze how Internet companies’ age-at-IPO relates to long-term 
stock performance. The sample consists of 116 Internet firms that went public on NASDAQ 
between 2003 and 2010. As predicted, I find that there is a significant U-shaped relationship 
between age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO performance. This implies that, on average, very 
young and old firms are most successful in the long run. The rationale for this finding is that 
Internet companies with quick IPOs have outstanding business models and can gain first-
mover advantages, whereas older companies benefit from learning effects and already 
maintained a competitive advantage – even without public funding. Severe underperformance 
is mainly found for medium-aged Internet companies going public (age of 6 to 10 years). 
Furthermore, this thesis provides evidence that profitable Internet firms that have an IPO 
perform better in the long run than their unprofitable counterparts. Still, in contrast to most 
academic research, I do not find a significant relationship between profitability in the year of 
the IPO and long-term firm survival. A possible explanation is that most studies include the 
burst of the dot-com bubble and thus contain a large number of quick IPOs with high failure 
rates, whereas this thesis focuses on Internet IPOs in the more stable years 2003 to 2010.            
The findings underline the importance of first-mover advantages, especially in winner-takes-
all Internet markets. Furthermore, they emphasize benefits from learning effects and the solid 
market position of older IPO companies. Overall, investors should carefully assess the IPO’s 
strategic implications and treat hot markets with caution – especially in the Internet sector.   
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Since the late 1990s, the Internet has been a main driver of new venture formation and 
worldwide economic development (Chang, 2004; Zacharakis, Shepherd & Coombs, 2003). 
As many Internet companies1 offer a lot of growth potential, they attract large amounts of 
investments (Johnston & Madura, 2002; Zarzecki, 2010) and can ultimately achieve an initial 
public offering (IPO). Sometimes firms achieve an IPO despite being very young, not 
profitable and thus, not yet financially sustainable. The phenomenon of companies going 
public before achieving profitability exists especially in the Internet industry and has 
therefore been increasingly observed during the last two decades (Jain, Jayaraman & Kini, 
2008; Lashinsky, 2006).  
The IPO is generally seen as an early-performance measure for startups, especially as pre-
IPO performance metrics are seldom available (Chang, 2004). But even though going public 
marks a milestone success for Internet ventures, it is not clear from academic literature what 
the relationship between firm age-at-IPO2 and long-term stock performance are. On the one 
hand, Chang (2004) shows that promising startups with credibility through venture capital 
(VC) financing and strategic alliances attain an IPO more quickly. A quick IPO might 
therefore indicate a stronger business model. Following this line of argumentation implies 
that companies with great VC investments and low age-at-IPO have more future potential and 
will, on average, perform better in the long run. Furthermore, capital is needed in order to 
grow and to achieve long-term success (Bessler & Seim, 2012). Thus, receiving large cash 
injections from the equity market and using the money for further growth could also lead to a 
low age-at-IPO indicating better long-term performance for Internet ventures. 
                                                 
1 Internet companies are defined in section 4.1 of this report. 
2 (Firm) age-at-IPO indicates the time that it takes a company from its date of legal incorporation to the IPO-
date. Occasionally, I use the term time-to-IPO in an interchangeable manner. 
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On the other hand, founders and early-investors of firms are incentivized to get cash for their 
equity as quickly as possible (Kim & Heshmati, 2010). When the business model of the 
company is less promising and shows significant weaknesses to these parties with internal 
knowledge, the motivation for a fast payout is even greater. Thus, a fast IPO might actually 
signal weak long-term potential rather than a bright future for the firm. Additionally, firm 
age-at-IPO highly reflects the general market conditions where going public is more likely in 
“hot markets” (Plotnicki & Szyszka, 2014, p. 49). The burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000 
has highlighted that fast IPOs – especially in the Internet industry – are often the consequence 
of tremendous overvaluation (Chang 2004; Jain et al., 2008; Zook, 2008).  
Older companies in contrast benefit from learning effects and have proven financial viability 
in the market (Jain et al., 2008; van der Goot, van Giersbergen & Botman, 2009). Wagner 
and Cockburn (2010) find that older companies have a lower risk to fail. Overall, this might 
indicate that a higher firm age-at-IPO is associated with better long-run performance.  
Following the above, the research question that this thesis aims to answer reads as follows: 
What is the relationship between firm age-at-IPO and the long-term 
performance of Internet companies? 
Furthermore, the overall research question is divided into three sub-questions. 
1) What is the relationship between firm age-at-IPO and the 5-year post-IPO stock 
performance of Internet companies? 
2) What is the relationship between firm age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO survival of 
Internet companies? 




In order to answer the above questions, a sample of 116 Internet companies that had an IPO 
on the NASDAQ stock exchange between 2003 and 2010 has been compiled and analyzed. 
The data was mainly collected from Datastream and Zephyr, two major databases providing 
general company and IPO-specific data. For each company in the sample, age-at-IPO has 
been measured as the months that passed from the date of legal incorporation until the IPO-
date. To analyze the companies’ performance, 5-year post-IPO excess returns have been 
calculated for each stock. I use the NASDAQ Composite Index3 as the benchmark portfolio 
to calculate excess return. Besides excess returns, I employ 5-year post-IPO firm survival as a 
dependent variable. Other variables that have been retrieved for each Internet firm in the 
sample are profitability, revenues and number of employees in the IPO year.  
This thesis consists of five parts that altogether aim at providing the reader with a coherent 
picture on the topic and a substantiated answer to the research question. First, I provide 
further theoretical background on Internet IPOs, company age-at-IPO, and the association 
with long-term performance and firm survival. Second, I develop several concrete, testable 
hypotheses on the relationship between Internet firms’ age-at-IPO and the 5-year past-IPO 
performance based on insights from existing literature. Third, the final sample and the 
methodology of this study are explained. Fourth, I present the results of the statistical data 
analysis, which mainly consists of multivariate regression models. The last section concludes 
this thesis with a discussion on the final results, including theoretical contributions, 
managerial implications, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
  
                                                 
3 The NASDAQ Composite Index is the market capitalization-weighted index of approximately 3,000 
companies listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange. 
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2. Theoretical background 
Ritter (1991) shows that the long-term performance of public offerings is heavily industry-
dependent. Also, Ritter (1991, p. 4) illustrates that IPO underperformance is mainly 
“concentrated among relatively young growth companies”, particularly highlighting 
computer and data processing companies. In line with Ritter’s findings on industry-
dependence, Clark (2002) reports that the relationship between age-at-IPO and aftermarket 
returns is significantly different for a sample of technology and non-technology firms. The 
author shows that young technology firms perform better, whereas for non-technology 
companies higher age-at-IPO is correlated with higher post-IPO stock performance (Clark, 
2002). It can be assumed that the findings are even more distinct for listed Internet firms in 
particular as they usually attract extremely large early-stage investments and have even 
higher growth prospects than technology firms in general (Demers & Lewellen, 2003). 
For Internet ventures, growth is a “strategic imperative”, especially in so-called “winner-
takes-all” (WTA) markets (Eisenmann, 2006, p. 1184). WTA markets refer to sectors where 
companies rely on first-mover advantages and network effects, such as the social media 
industry (Noe & Parker, 2005). Internet firms in these markets, e.g. Facebook and Twitter, 
therefore acquire large amounts of capital in order to develop quickly and to outperform 
competition. As acquiring financial resources for growth is of utmost importance for Internet 
ventures, an IPO constitutes a crucial strategic move for many of these firms (Eisenmann, 
2006; Gill & Walz, 2016). Schultz and Zaman (2001) show that young IPO companies 
usually gain first-mover advantages and outperform competition. Furthermore, since financial 
information from periods previously to the IPO is usually not available, going public is 
generally often used as an early success measure (Chang, 2004; Kim & Heshmati, 2010).  
It has been shown that Internet companies with greater VC investments and more reputable 
investors attain IPOs more quickly (Chang, 2004; Johnston & Madura, 2002). As venture 
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capitalists carefully select their investments, it can be argued that the heavily funded, fast-
IPO firms have better business models in general. Therefore, quick-IPO Internet stocks seem 
to be more likely to show greater performance in the long run. Banerjee, Güçbilmez, & 
Pawlina (2016) further argue that it is optimal for companies with high growth opportunities 
to go public as early as possible. According to Clark (2002, p. 385), “holding all else equal, 
the better a firm’s idea, product or business model, the greater the opportunity cost of delay, 
and the earlier the firm will go public”. He further argues that the low average age-at-IPO 
during the 1990s might thus be an indication for an era of “unusually promising firms” 
(Clark, 2002, p. 385).  
The general view that the IPO event by itself denotes a success, that capital is needed for 
growth and that investors selected the best businesses for an IPO may lead to the assumption: 
The faster the IPO, the better the company and the more successful it will be in the long run. 
Even though it is intuitive, there are also several arguments opposing this assumption.  
Jain et al. (2008) show that VC-financing has a negative effect on the likelihood of post-IPO 
profitability.4 These findings indicate that there might be also negative implications from 
heavy early-stage funding for growth with regards to the long-term development of Internet 
firms. The crisis of 2000 serves as an illustrative example. Not only were Internet firms that 
went public before the burst of the dot-com bubble much younger than in previous decades 
(Clark, 2002), but also the percentage of unprofitable firms having an IPO rose significantly 
in the late 20th century (Doffou, 2014; Jain et al., 2008). This growing tendency to have a fast 
IPO “on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability” can mainly be 
attributed to an increase in the percentage of technology companies going public, especially 
                                                 
4 The result from Jain et al. (2008) might be due to the fact that the authors studied a sample from 1996 to 2000, 
which is strongly associated with the Internet boom and the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000. In contrast to 
Jain et al. (2008), Rosenbusch et al. (2013) find that profitability is not affected by pre-IPO VC investments. 
Still, this also indicates that there would be no significantly positive impact of VC-funding on profitability. 
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Internet firms (Jain et al., 2008, p. 166). Rajgopal, Venkatachalam and Kotha (2000) argue 
that traditional accounting rules do not apply for the valuation of Internet businesses. The 
authors indicate that for these firms, significant market valuations usually coexist with 
negative accounting earnings (Rajgopal et al., 2000)5. Ritter and Welch (2002) show that the 
percentage of unprofitable firms going public rose from 19% in the 1980s to 37% during 
1995-1998. Schultz and Zaman (2001) even find that only 8.72% of the Internet firms that 
went public between January 1999 and March 2000 were profitable in the quarter prior to the 
IPO. Yet this phenomenon is not specific to the dot-com bust as just a few years later the 
trend of being unprofitable at IPO accelerated again (Jain et al., 2008; Lashinsky, 2006). 
Despite enjoying the early success of going public, unprofitable, young companies often 
show disappointing long-term performance after the hyped IPO (Jain et al., 2008). This is in 
line with Peristiani and Hong (2004) who find that pre-IPO profitability serves as a good 
predictor for post-IPO survival. Consequently, many of the hyped young and unprofitable 
Internet companies going public are likely to get into financial difficulties, as the burst of the 
dot-com bubble has illustrated.  
The level of IPO underpricing is often used as a proxy for firm risk, with higher IPO 
underpricing indicating greater risk (Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) find additional evidence to confirm the findings of Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) that younger IPOs usually come with greater underpricing due to the high 
level of uncertainty regarding future returns. Thus, this serves as an indication that older 
firms, which have a longer history and more available accounting information, are less risky 
and more stable regarding their long-term performance (Engelen & van Essen, 2010; van der 
                                                 
5 In contrast to Rajgopal et al. (2000), Bhattacharya, Demers and Joos (2010) find that accounting information is 
relevant for the valuation of Internet companies. Still, the authors show that there was a significant increase in 
IPO valuations in the years of the Internet bubble (Bhattacharya et al., 2010). 
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Goot, van Giersbergen & Botman, 2009). In line with this, previous studies find that going 
public at a later stage might be ideal because the pre-IPO learning process is very important 
for companies as it may reduce the chance of making “costly mistakes” (Clark, 2002, p. 385). 
In accordance with the previous discussion, research on the relationship between age-at-IPO 
and post-IPO performance shows divergent results. Wagner and Cockburn (2010) find that 
older companies perform better since they have a lower risk of failure. The authors show that 
the chance of firm survival increases with an additional year of pre-IPO existence by roughly 
3% (Wagner & Cockburn, 2010). Ritter (1991, p. 20) also analyzes the long-run performance 
of IPOs and finds a significant positive “monotone relation” between firm age-at-IPO and 
aftermarket performance. In line with the results from Ritter (1991), Clark (2002) finds that 
overall, there is a positive relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance, 
indicating that, on average, older firms show better 3-year post-IPO stock returns.  
Nevertheless, when dividing the sample into non-technology and technology firms, results 
diverge in Clark’s study. For non-technology firms, the pattern of higher age-at-IPO 
anticipating better performance is even more significant, whereas for the technology firms the 
opposite relationship occurs and younger firms perform significantly better (Clark, 2002). 
More recently, Andriansyah, and Messinis (2016) also find evidence for a negative 
association between firm age and financial post-IPO performance, especially with regards to 
profit margin. Banerjee, Güçbilmez, & Pawlina (2016) further show that young first-mover 
companies grant higher underpricing at IPO and have stronger operating performance in the 
long run compared to their older counterparts. 
Kim and Heshmati (2010) investigate the relationship of age-at-IPO and the 3-year post-IPO 
performance for a set of Korean IT hardware firms. Their findings show no significant effect 
of age-at-IPO on post-IPO performance, but they suggest further research to be conducted 
with different samples and longer-term horizons (Kim & Heshmati, 2010).  
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Figure 1 below summarizes the major findings from past academic literature regarding the 
relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance.  
 
Figure 1: Relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance from literature 
This thesis makes the research on the relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO 
performance not only more specific by focusing on Internet companies, but also analyzes 5-
year post-IPO performance and thus has a significant long-term focus. Ritter (1991) studies 
the long-run performance of IPOs by investigating only 3-year post-IPO performance. He 
shows that the third year leads to the overall significant underperformance of IPOs, whereas 
the first two years do not show significant results. Also, Ritter (1991, p. 5) presents evidence 
from previous research that suggests “positive performance in the fifth year” after the public 
offering. Therefore, investigating five years can add additional insights when analyzing the 
long-term performance of tech-IPOs.  
Concerning the time range of Internet IPOs, Bessler and Seim (2012, p. 216) argue to study a 
period from 1996 to 2010 as this includes two “IPO waves and stock market cycles”. Still, the 
authors present empirical evidence for the existence of major differences between the “new 
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& Seim, 2012, p. 231). To illustrate these differences, figure 2 shows the total number of 
Internet IPOs in the U.S. per year for the time period from 1992 to 2013 (data source: Ritter, 
2016).6  
 
Figure 2: Number of Internet IPOs per year, 1992-2013 
The chart clearly shows that the years 1998 to 2000 (highlighted in the figure) are not 
representative with a total number of 460 Internet IPOs – 153.33 per year on average. 
Between 2003 and 2010, in contrast, there were 14.5 Internet IPOs per year on average. Also, 
due to the hype from 1998 to 2000, dot-com IPOs happened extremely fast and companies 
were very young in this period (Zacharakis et al., 2003). Additionally, the percentage of 
unprofitable companies that went public based on uncertain growth expectations and the 
accompanying high failure rate were much more significant in the years of the dot-com crisis 
(Jain et al., 2008; Lashinsky, 2006). 
Because of these major differences, I exclude these years from the analysis, as this would 
                                                 
6 Appendix A shows an overview of the annual number of U.S. IPOs from 1992 to 2013 across industries and 
highlights Internet IPOs for comparison. It becomes clear that the proportion of Internet companies going public 

























give a distorted picture on the association between Internet companies’ age-at-IPO and post-
IPO performance. Not only the years until the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000 are 
excluded, but also the two following years 2001 and 2002, since the crisis aftermath was 
highly affected by investor restraint and general skepticism towards Internet ventures 
(Bessler & Seim, 2012). Furthermore, the Internet sector and many business models around it 
were still pre-mature and investor understanding was often not well developed (Zook, 2008). 
Starting in 2003 therefore gives a more representative sample to analyze the research 
question at hand.  
Overall, the IPO of a venture constitutes an important strategic move (Gill & Walz, 2016) 
and lays the foundation for following decisions and future financial performance. Still, there 
is a research gap in the academic literature on the relationship between age-at-IPO and the 
long-term performance of Internet companies. This thesis aims at closing that research gap. 
3. Hypotheses development 
In this section, I will develop testable hypotheses in order to answer the research question 
with substantiated evidence. The hypotheses are based on arguments from existing academic 
literature that are briefly summarized and related to the more specific context of Internet 
companies.  
3.1 Age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO stock performance 
As I have shown in section 2, the findings from academic literature on the relationship 
between age-at-IPO and long-term performance diverge significantly.  
Most research shows that overall, older IPO firms perform better in the years after the public 
offering (Clark, 2002; Ritter, 1991; van der Goot et al., 2009; Wagner & Cockburn, 2010). 
The pre-IPO learning process associated with refining the business model as described by 
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Clark (2002) is one major reason why older firms perform better on average. Also, older 
companies have already shown that they can survive in the market and that they have a viable 
business model. Current examples from the Internet sector are Airbnb, Uber, and Spotify – 
three companies that have market leadership and already went through several rounds of 
large-scale VC-funding (Basulto, 2015; Braithwaite, 2016). Still, it seems like they are 
waiting for the strategically optimal timing for their IPO in order to avoid costly mistakes. 
For example, in the case of Uber, there are still legal issues in some countries with regards to 
the firm’s service offering. Clarifying these elements prior to an IPO will increase certainty 
around the business model and give the firm the opportunity of a higher valuation (Basulto, 
2015). Overall, these companies already have a competitive advantage even without the cash 
injection from the capital market. Also, founders and early-investors seem to be comfortable 
with waiting for payout as they have trust in the long-term viability of their business model 
associated with recurring positive cash flows. In general, it can therefore be expected that a 
higher age-at-IPO is associated with better post-IPO performance for Internet companies. 
Still, there are also important findings with regards to young IPO companies. For a subset of 
technology firms, Clark (2002) finds that firm age-at-IPO is negatively associated with 3-year 
post-IPO performance. As Internet companies clearly fall into this sector, the findings from 
Clark are of significant importance for this study. The rationale behind quick IPO companies 
being most successful is that the opportunity costs of a delay would be too high if the 
business model and the growth opportunities are promising (Banerjee et al., 2016; Clark, 
2002). Andriansyah and Messinis (2016) emphasize this rationale by showing that firm age is 
negatively associated with long-term financial performance, taking into account several 
financial performance indicators like profit margin. Banerjee et al. (2016) also document that 
IPO first-movers have higher investments, more growth and enhanced profitability after the 
public offering. As significant first-mover advantages are found (Schultz & Zaman, 2001), it 
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can be assumed that these are even more prominent in the Internet sector that is often 
associated with so-called winner-takes-all (WTA) markets (Eisenmann, 2006; Noe & Parker, 
2005). In WTA markets, network effects and first-mover advantages often leave one 
company with a monopoly position, as observed e.g. in the search engine market. Thus, there 
is also evidence to argue for young companies having better financial performance in the long 
run after an IPO. 
Internet firms with a medium age-at-IPO may likely stand for the phenomenon of making the 
decision to go public depend more on general market conditions than on internal strategic 
choices. In other words, they might represent the willingness of investors to maximize returns 
during “hot market conditions” (Plotnicki & Szyszka, 2014, p. 49). Wagner and Cockburn 
(2010) find that companies going public in phases of enormous market valuations in the high-
tech sector have significantly lower long-term performance and a higher chance of failure.  
In general, young Internet IPO companies perform very well due to their high-potential 
business models, first-mover advantages and investment capacities for growth. Companies 
with high age-at-IPO perform very well on average due to their proven business models and 
the already existing competitive advantage. Medium-aged companies are sometimes “stuck in 
the middle” and tend to go public mainly based on the general market conditions and pressure 
from investors. This line of argumentation goes well with Kim & Heshmati (2010) who do 
not find a significant linear association between age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance.  
Following the above, I hypothesize: 
H1: The relationship between Internet companies’ age-at-IPO and the 5-year post-IPO stock 
performance is U-shaped. On average, Internet companies with low and high age-at-IPO 
perform better in the long run.  
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3.2 Age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO survival  
As shown before, Internet companies stand for high growth prospects and quick IPOs. Yet, 
they also are noted for higher risk and great failures as represented mainly by the burst of the 
dot-com bubble in April 2000 (Zook, 2008). Therefore, I do not only analyze long-term 
performance based on 5-year stock returns, but also on post-IPO firm survival. In case that a 
company was delisted due to negative reasons (bankruptcy or ceased operations), I will use 
the term exit to indicate non-survival (Hensler et al., 1997; Park & Steensma, 2012)7.  
Ritter (1991) explains that initial returns8 are higher for young IPO-firms due to the higher 
risk that they inhibit. Other authors validate the findings from Ritter and show a significant 
negative relationship between firm age and IPO underpricing (Engelen & van Essen, 2010; 
Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Age-at-IPO therefore constitutes a viable “proxy for risk” (Ritter, 
1991, p. 20). Similarly, Johnston and Madura (2002) find that initial returns are higher for 
Internet companies than for non-Internet IPOs. The authors show that Internet IPOs involve 
higher risk and that underwriters therefore could be “forced to allow for additional 
underpricing at the time of issue” (Johnston & Madura, 2002, p. 526). This goes in line with 
Ritter’s explanation and underlines the high risk of fast Internet IPOs more specifically. 
Despite positive initial returns, the young firms in Ritter’s sample show not only worse long-
term stock performance, but also a much higher bankruptcy rate. Clark (2002) describes 
similar findings. Even though Clark (2002) shows that young technology firms perform better 
than their older counterparts on average, his results also indicate higher distressed delisting 
rates for young companies. In particular, the author presents significant evidence that young 
tech-companies are “more likely to suffer extreme financial difficulty” (Clark, 2002, p. 386). 
                                                 
7 The only reasons for delisting that do not indicate failures are mergers and moving to another exchange, e.g. 
from NASDAQ to NYSE or to AMEX (Hensler et al., 1997).  
8 Initial returns refer to the stock returns on the first day of trading. 
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Other authors also find that increasing firm age lowers the risk of bankruptcy after a public 
offering (Hensler, Rutherford & Springer, 1997). Hensler et al. (1997) further indicate that 
the chance of survival is reduced significantly if the respective company is in the computer 
and data industry.  
The reason for the lower risk of older firms is twofold. First, older companies are more steady 
and mature. Thus, they inhibit less uncertainty about the future performance (van der Goot et 
al., 2009). Second, with a longer history, managers of more mature businesses can easily 
reduce information asymmetry before the IPO (van der Goot et al., 2009), which is highly 
important from an investor perspective.  
Following the evidence from existing literature on the relationship between age-at-IPO and 
post-IPO firm survival for companies in general and for technology firms in particular, I 
hypothesize the following:  
H2: There is a positive relationship between age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO survival for 
Internet companies. 
3.3 Profitability in the IPO year and post-IPO performance 
Jain et al. (2008) state that there is a general trend for companies to go public without having 
achieved profitability. The authors attribute this tendency to have an IPO “on the basis of a 
promise of profitability” mainly to the growing number of technology firms going public 
(Jain et al., 2008, p. 166). Especially Internet companies in WTA markets are often valued 
based on growth prospects and not on the basis of existing positive cash flows (Doffou, 2014; 
Lashinsky, 2006). Nonetheless, profitability serves as an important indicator of the long-term 
viability and financial performance of a business (Jain et al., 2008). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between profitability in the year of the IPO and the 5-
year post-IPO stock performance for Internet companies. 
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Overall, investors often underestimate the risk of unprofitability at IPO, overestimate the 
expected growth potential and many high-risk Internet ventures are doomed to fail (Jain et al., 
2008; Peristiani & Hong, 2004). According to Peristiani & Hong (2004, p. 1) pre-issue 
profitability is highly correlated with aftermarket firm survival. As this holds true for firms in 
general, I assume that profitability in the IPO-year is highly relevant for higher-risk Internet 
ventures. Consequently, I hypothesize that profitable Internet firms going public are 
significantly more likely to survive than those with negative net income.  
H4: There is a positive relationship between Internet firm profitability in the IPO year and 
the likelihood of 5-year post-IPO survival. 
Furthermore, the relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO firm survival, as predicted in 
hypothesis H2, is likely to be impacted by the profitability in the year of the IPO. Very young 
Internet companies that are already profitable might be more likely to survive post-IPO than 
young firms that are not profitable. Therefore, I hypothesize that a moderation effect of 
profitability on this relationship exists.  
H5: Profitability in the IPO year has a moderating effect on the relationship between age-at-
IPO and 5-year post-IPO survival of Internet companies, with greater profitability 
decreasing the strength of this relationship. 
4. Data and methodology 
In this section, I will describe the data that has been used for this study as well as the applied 
methodology. First, I will shed light on the classification of Internet companies as used for 
this study. This is of great importance since a universal definition and categorization of 
Internet firms does not exist. Second, I will describe the sample of this study and the data 
collection procedure. Third, the dependent variables and the explanatory variables are 
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introduced and explained. In section 4.5, I will introduce the control variables used for this 
study. In the last section of this part, I describe the empirical approach of this thesis.  
4.1 Classification of Internet companies 
The unit of analysis in this study is Internet companies. Even though the term is widely used, 
Zook (2008) recognizes that it cannot be applied only to one specific business model or 
sector. Therefore, Zook (2008, p. 6) broadly describes Internet companies as “fast-growing 
companies which use the Internet as an integral part of their business model”. Hand (2000) 
also uses a general description and simply investigates a set of firms that would not have been 
established without the existence of the Internet. For the purpose of this thesis, I define an 
Internet company as a firm that receives more than 50% of its revenues due to the existence 
of the Internet (Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Demers & Lewellen, 2003). In case of doubt, I 
further apply the broader definitions by Zook (2010) and Hand (2000). 
Since there is no Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for Internet companies 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Demers & Lewellen, 2003), I have consulted different sources in 
order to come up with a sound dataset. First, I used various keywords like “Internet”, “dot-
com”, “online” and “e-commerce” on siccodes.com to retrieve a list of SIC codes that include 
Internet-specific companies. Some of the major code categories are 737 (Computer 
programming, data Processing, and other computer related services), 4812 (Radiotelephone 
communications), 4899 (Communication services – not elsewhere classified), 8999 (Services 
– not elsewhere classified) and 52-59 (Retail trade). Second, I retrieved the relevant data on 
companies with the identified SIC codes from Datastream and Zephyr. Third, I enriched the 
dataset with a list of Internet IPOs between 1990 and 2013 from Ritter (2016) that can be 
downloaded in Excel format on the website of the Warrington College of Business 
Administration. Fourth, I went through the preliminary dataset and checked companies where 
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I had doubt on matching the definitions for Internet companies by Demers and Lewellen 
(2003) and Zook (2008). For many companies such as Alphabet (formerly Google), it was 
clear that they belong to the dataset of Internet companies. When I was unsure about the 
classification based on company name and SIC code, I went to the short business profile on 
nasdaq.com to judge whether could be defined as Internet companies or not. Here, I applied 
the broad definitions stated earlier. If there were further doubts, I searched for information on 
the company website and reviewed SEC filings. This procedure does not only guarantee for a 
highly relevant dataset of Internet companies, but also gave me a better understanding of the 
sample. Table 1 shows an overview of the sample distribution in terms of simplified industry 
segments. Most Internet companies have the SIC code 737 (Computer Programming, Data 
Processing, and Other Computer Related Services), accounting for 58.62% of the final 
sample.  
Table 1: Sample distribution in simplified industry segments 
SIC code Description Total Percentage 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 1 0.86% 
35; 36; 38 Electronics 9 7.76% 
47 Transportation Services 3 2.59% 
48 Communications 6 5.17% 
55; 59 Retail 7 6.03% 
60; 62; 64 Finance 7 6.03% 
73 Business Services 79 68.10% 
736 Personnel Supply Services 1 0.86% 
737 Computer Programming, Data Processing, and other Computer Related Services 68 58.62% 
738 Miscellaneous Business Services 10 8.62% 
80 Health Services 1 0.86% 
82 Educational Services 3 2.59% 
 
TOTAL 116 100% 
  
Some remarkable exceptions to the general classification schema exist. For example, 
Cimpress (went public as Vistaprint in 2005) has the SIC code 2750, which stands for 
Commercial Printing. Still, according to the definitions applied, the company must be 
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considered an Internet company. The firm profile on nasdaq.com includes the following: 
“… We seek to offer compelling value to our customers through an innovative use of technology, a broad 
selection of customized printed products, low pricing and personalized customer service. Through our 
use of proprietary Internet-based graphic design software, 16 localized websites, proprietary order 
receiving and processing technologies and advanced computer integrated printing facilities, we offer a 
meaningful economic advantage relative to traditional graphic design and printing methods. …” 
The company’s strategy of providing services via Internet-based software, which is key to its 
value proposition and brings the majority of revenues, clearly makes it an Internet firm. 
4.2 Sample and data collection 
The final sample consists of 116 Internet companies (as defined and selected in the previous 
section) with IPOs on NASDAQ between 2003 and 2010.9 NASDAQ was chosen as the 
stock exchange for the sample since it hosts the vast majority of technology-IPOs worldwide 
(Clark, 2002) and because data on stocks, as well as on a benchmark index can be obtained in 
a reliable manner. The data for the final sample was retrieved from Datastream and Zephyr, 
which are two major business and IPO databases. Further information was collected from the 
listing information on nasdaq.com, from the technology database crunchbase.com and from 
SEC filings like annual reports.  
Most importantly, the final dataset includes SIC code, companies’ date of legal incorporation, 
IPO date, and total revenues, net income and number of employees in the IPO year. It also 
contains monthly closing stock prices for the five years after going public. From all this 
information, age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO stock returns are calculated.  
In the 5-year post-IPO performance analysis, it occurs that companies get delisted from the 
NASDAQ stock exchange. A delisting might occur for different reasons. Some of these 
reasons, like bankruptcy, denote failure events, whereas others such as mergers can have 
                                                 
9 An overview of the final sample can be seen in Appendix B. 
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different implications (Hensler et al., 1997). Out of the 116 Internet companies going public 
on NASDAQ between 2003 and 2010, 34 were delisted in the five years after the IPO. From 
these 34 companies, 24 were delisted due to mergers or moving to the NYSE. The remaining 
10 companies were delisted for negative reasons, which are bankruptcy and ceased operations 
(Hensler et al., 1997). All the 34 companies that were delisted are still included in the sample. 
The stock price return from the month of listing until delisting is then carried forward to the 
end of the 60th month (end of the 5-year period) and used for the subsequent analysis. 
4.3 Dependent variables 
Excess log return 
As suggested by Ritter (1991), I use stock returns as a proxy for the 5-year post-IPO 
performance. In particular, I employ the variable Excess log return as a dependent variable in 
linear regression models. Therefore, I first calculate logarithmic stock returns after 60 
months, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡=60, for each individual stock in the sample as shown in equation 1.  
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡=60 = ln (
𝑝𝑖,𝑡=60
𝑝𝑖,𝑡=0
) − 1 (1) 
I use logarithmic returns in order to obtain a (close to) normally distributed dataset since 
general holding period returns have large outliers (e.g. maximum of 937% return for Baidu 
Inc.). These outliers are only found for positive returns since the minimum possible holding 
period return is -100%. The use of the natural logarithm basically treats returns as cumulative 
stock returns over time. 
Next, I calculate excess returns, 𝑒𝑟𝑖, as suggested by Clark (2002) and Ritter (1991). This 
ensures that the influence of general market swings is minimized. Excess returns are 




10 The benchmark portfolio that I chose for the purpose of this study is the 
NASDAQ Composite Index, which is the market capitalization-weighted index of all 
companies listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange11. The benchmark portfolio’s return was 
calculated in the same way as the individual stock returns (equation 2). 
 
𝑟𝑏,𝑡=60 = ln (
𝑝𝑏,𝑡=60
𝑝𝑏,𝑡=0
) − 1 (2) 
Then, for each stock, the representing 5-year period benchmark return was subtracted in order 
to get the excess stock return (equation 3).  
 𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡=60 =  𝑟𝑖,𝑡=60 −  𝑟𝑏,𝑡=60 (3) 
Survival 
The long-term performance of companies is often measured by post-IPO firm survival 
(Hensler et al., 1997; Banerjee et al., 2007). This variable is binary, meaning that it can either 
have the value 0 or 1. For the purpose of this study, 1 denotes firm survival and 0 denotes exit 
within the five years after the initial offering. Throughout this thesis, exit stands for a firm 
turning defunct, which According to Park and Steensma (2012) describes a delisting due to 
negative reasons, i.e. bankruptcy and ceased operations. Only 10 companies in the final 
sample had an exit within the 5-year post-IPO period (8.62%).  
4.4 Explanatory variables  
Age-at-IPO 
The time that it takes an Internet company from date of incorporation until the IPO is the 
primary explanatory variable in this study. I measure this variable in months. Figure 3 shows 
                                                 
10 Excess returns are typically calculated through market models (e.g. CAPM) to account for companies’ betas 
(MacKinlay, 1997). According to Ritter (1991), post-IPO firms’ betas to respective indexes do usually not have 
significant economic effects on the outcomes. Therefore, I determine excess returns without adjusting for betas.  
11 The monthly 5-year returns of the NASDAQ Composite Index (01/2008 - 12/2015) are shown in Appendix C. 
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that the data on age-at-IPO in this dataset is highly skewed to the right. The observations on 
the far right (age > 15 years) represent older companies that adapted their business strategy 
only after the appearance of the Internet. Thus, in their years of incorporation (before 1990) 
they would not have been Internet companies. Only later, these firms created product lines 
and services based on the web, which let them grow and attain an IPO. Nevertheless, these 
firms are defined as Internet companies since the majority of their revenue is made due to the 
Internet. As the data is skewed to the right, I decide to reduce the influence of older 
companies by conducting the analyses with two different age-at-IPO variables.  
Figure 3: Distribution of the dataset in terms of age-at-IPO 
First, I take the natural logarithm of the age-at-IPO variable. The log-transformation of the 
variable standardizes the distribution and erases the influence of existing outliers. Second, I 
make a breakdown of the sample in terms of quintiles with regards to the age-at-IPO as 
applied by Clark (2002).12 Thus, five age-at-IPO groups are compared based on average 5-
year post-IPO excess log returns (see table 2). The youngest quintile has a maximum age-at-
IPO of 71 months (6 years), whereas firms in the oldest quintile are at least 138 months (11.5 
                                                 






























years) old. The medium quintile has an age-at-IPO-range of 94 to 112 months. 
Table 2: Age-at-IPO quintiles 
Quintile Age-at-IPO (in months) Number of firms 
1 28-71 22 
2 72-92 24 
3 93-112 23 
4 113-137 24 
5 138-317 23 
 TOTAL 116 
 
Profit margin  
Several authors describe a significant impact of firm profitability on the long-run 
performance of listed companies (Jain et al., 2008; Peristiani & Hong, 2004). Therefore, I 
assume that the profit margin in the year of the IPO is positively associated with long-term 
post-IPO firm performance (H3) and post-IPO firm survival (H4). Furthermore, since I 
assume that the relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO survival is impacted by a 
firm’s profitability, I use the variable Profit margin as a moderating variable in hypothesis 
H5. It is hypothesized that profitability decreases the strength of the relationship in a sense 
that younger firms, which are profitable are more likely to survive, whereas older firms with 
less profitability are more likely to fail. 
For each firm in the sample, I retrieve profits in the year of the IPO as well as revenues. 
Through this, the variable Profit margin is calculated and used in the subsequent analysis. 
The profit margins of firms in the sample do not have severe outliers and the data is not 
skewed. Due to the relatively normal distribution, I do not standardize this variable. In order 
to investigate the moderating effect of profitability, I create an interaction variable by 
multiplying profit margin in the IPO year with the independent variable age-at-IPO.  
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4.5 Control variables  
Hensler et al. (1997) show that large IPOs have a better position in the market and a stronger 
base of resources than smaller IPOs in order to prosper despite bad investments or declining 
market valuations. Size is thus positively associated with companies’ post-IPO performance, 
in particular with post-IPO survival (Hensler et al., 1997). Ritter (1991) also finds that 
smaller firms have worse aftermarket performance.  
In order to reduce the influence of firm size on the long-run performance of Internet IPOs, I 
control for firm size in this study. The two control variables that I use for this purpose are 
revenues in the year of the IPO (Revenues) and number of employees in the year of the IPO 
(Employees).  
4.6 Empirical approach 
This thesis focuses on the quantitative analysis of collected secondary data. In order to 
investigate the hypothesized relationships, I construct several regression models and analyze 
them. The two dependent variables used in this study are different variable types. Excess log 
return, which is used as a proxy for 5-year post-IPO performance is a continuous variable, 
whereas Survival (5-year post-IPO firm survival) is a binary variable. For the continuous 
variable Excess log return, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models (H1 & H3). 
First, I analyze the U-shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and the post-IPO performance 
as predicted in hypothesis H1. Second, I investigate the hypothesized positive association 
between profitability and post-IPO performance (H3). The significance of the regression 
models is tested mainly by looking at the overall F-statistic and through looking at the 
significance of the predictors’ coefficients.  
Since the second dependent variable Survival is either 0 (exit) or 1 (survival), a binary 
logistic regression model has to be applied. Binary logistic regression makes it possible to 
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analyze how well predictor variables explain a dependent variable that is categorical (Pallant, 
2013). It further indicates how adequate the model is by “assessing goodness of fit” (Pallant, 
2013, p. 171). Pallant (2013) explains that in logistic regression, the distribution of the 
explanatory variables is not important, but that these models are sensitive to multicollinearity, 
which arises when high correlations between predictors exists. Since outliers might influence 
the results of binary logistic regression (Pallant, 2013), it is important to apply the 
normalization procedures for the explanatory variable age-at-IPO as discussed in section 4.4 
of this thesis.  
Besides the regression models, I will compare the age-at-IPO quintiles based on their average 
post-IPO performance and the rate of firm survival within each group. For a proper analysis 
of the quintiles, I conduct a one-way analysis of variance and a chi-square test.  
All of the analyses in this thesis have been conducted with the statistics computer software 
IBM SPSS 24. 
5. Results 
In this part of the thesis, I am presenting the results of the empirical analysis that has been 
conducted as described previously. First, I show the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Second, I present the results of linear regression models against the dependent variable 
Excess log return, which is used as a proxy for 5-year post-IPO performance. Third, the 
results for binary logistic regression models against the dependent variable Survival are 
highlighted. Fourth, I analyze the age-at-IPO quintiles based on their respective excess log 
returns and survival rates. In section 5.5, I will discuss several robustness tests in order to 
increase the strengths of the outcomes from previous analyses.  
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5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the final sample. The median age-at-IPO is 102 
months, which translates to 8.5 years. Nevertheless, the mean age-at-IPO is 115.53 months 
(9.6 years). The mean is significantly higher than the median due to the fact that the data is 
skewed to the right as presented in section 4.4. This emphasizes the importance of 
standardizing age-at-IPO and creating age-at-IPO quintiles from the dataset. The same 
phenonemon as for age-at-IPO can also be observed for the excess returns: the data has 
severe outliers on the right part of the data. The median excess return is only -13%, whereas 
the mean is 18%.  
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable Description N Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Age-at-IPO In months 116 115.53 102 58.19 28 317 
Age-at-IPO log 
Natural logarithm of 
Age-at-IPO 
116 4.64 4.62 0.46 3.33 5.76 
Excess return 
5-year post-IPO excess 
return  
116 0.18 -0.13 1.49 -2.18 9.36 
Excess log return 
Natural logarithm of 
excess return 
116 -0.43 -0.14 1.46 -6.76 2.33 
Survival  
1 if survival, 0 if exit; 
5-year post IPO 
116 0.91 1 0.28 0 1 
Employees 
Number of employees; 
In year of IPO 
116 567.76 325 697.02 14 4,400 
Revenues In year of IPO; in 000s 116 214,407 91,405 538,072 813 3,947,105 
Profit In year of IPO; in 000s 116 12,915.69 4,532.50 58,578.53 -135,169 399,119 
Profit margin In year of IPO  116 0.02 0.05 0.28 -1.07 0.77 
 
The minimum and maximum values for Employees and Revenues in the year of the initial 
public offering show that there are big differences in the sample with regards to company 
size. The smallest company in terms of employees just employed 14 people (software 
company Copsync), whereas the largest already counted 4,400 employees when going public 
(travel platform Expedia). In terms of revenues, the smallest company in the sample had sales 
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of less than one million U.S. dollars (advertising platform Sito Mobile), wheres the largest 
made almost four billion U.S. dollars in revenues in the IPO year (travel platform 
MakeMyTrip). The vast differences in the sample are further highlighted by the large 
standard deviations for these two variables (697.02 for employees; 538,072 for revenues). 
Correlations between the variables used in this thesis can be seen in the correlation matrix of 
table 4. The two explanatory variables of this study, Age-at-IPO (log) and Profit margin are 
not significantly correlated with each other, so that multicollinearity is not a problem (Pallant, 
2013). For control variables – in this thesis Employees and Revenues – multicollinearity is 
generally not an issue (Pallant, 2013). Naturally, the variables Age-at-IPO and Excess return 
are highly correlated with their own natural logarithms.  
The dependent variables Excess log return and Survival are correlated significantly at the 1% 
confidence level with a correlation coefficient of 0.695. This is intuitive as both are measures 
of long-term corporate performance. It also confirms the logic behind including the two 
variables in this study to identify different aspects of Internet firms’ sustainable development.  
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Age-at-IPO 1.000 
        (2) Age-at-IPO log 0.949** 1.000 
       (3) Excess return 0.078 0.027 1.000 
      (4) Excess log return 0.125 0.057 0.710** 1.000 
     (5) Survival 0.111 0.074 0.276** 0.695** 1.000 
    (6) Employees 0.203* 0.198* 0.125 0.171 0.160 1.000 
   (7) Revenues 0.094 0.120 0.041 0.057 0.087 0.395** 1.000 
  (8) Profit 0.002 0.000 0.107 0.125 0.078 0.299** 0.584** 1.000 
 (9) Profit margin 0.017 -0.01 0.109 0.150 0.004 0.092 0.045 0.110 1.000 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
      * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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5.2 Linear regression  
In this section, I will employ linear regression models in order to assess the hypothesized U-
shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and the 5-year post-IPO stock performance (H1). 
Additionally, I will analyze whether a positive association between profitability in the year of 
the IPO and long-term stock returns exists as predicted in hypothesis H3. Table 5 provides an 
overview of the results from linear regression models with the dependent variable Excess log 
return. 
Table 5: Results of linear regression models 
Dependent variable: Excess log return 
Variable Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 5A Model 6A 
Constant -0.884*** -0.989 0.173 20.081** -0.622*** 16.769* 
 
(0.307) (1.396) (0.666) (8.883) (0.171) (8.883) 
Age-at-IPO 0.002  -0.014    
 
(0.002)  (0.010)    
Age-at-IPO²   0.005*    
 
  (0.000)    
Age-at-IPO log  0.078  -9.023**  -7.666** 
 
 (0.303)  (3.803)  (3.798) 
Age-at-IPO log²    0.974**  0.837** 
 
   (0.406)  (0.405) 
Profit margin     1.151** 1.027** 
     (0.479) (0.483) 
Employees 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.038 0.030 0.065 0.078 0.077 0.114 
df 2 2 3 3 2 4 
F-statistic 1.467 1.147 1.915 2.338 3.111 2.834 
P-value 0.227 0.333 0.113 0.060 0.029 0.019 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
First, I test for a linear relationship between Age-at-IPO and Excess log returns. Model 1A 
and 2A include only the control variables Employees and Revenues, as well as an age-at-IPO 
variable as predictor (Model 1A: Age-at-IPO; Model 2A: Age-at-IPO log). In both of these 
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two models, there is no significant relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO 
performance, as indicated by statistically insignificant coefficients for the age-at-IPO 
variables. Overall, models 1A and 2A also show very low F-statistics (1.467 and 1.147) and 
high p-values (0.227 and 0.333). Thus, these two models do not indicate a significant positive 
or negative linear association between age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance for Internet 
companies.  
Next, I test for a U-shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and post-IPO excess returns as 
predicted in hypothesis H1. Therefore, I include a squared term of the age-at-IPO variables in 
the models 3A and 4A. Model 3A includes age-at-IPO in months and an age-at-IPO squared 
term. The overall model is not statistically significant (F-statistic = 1.915, p > 0.10), but the 
squared predictor variable (ß = 0.005, p < 0.10) is significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Even though the overall log-linear model is not statistically significant, interestingly the two 
independent variables go into the direction of a U-shape, with the linear term being negative 
and the squared term being slightly positive.  
This U-shaped relationship is much more apparent and statistically significant in the log-log 
model 4A, which uses the natural logarithm of age-at-IPO and its squared term as predictor 
variables. In this model, the coefficients of both independent variables are significant at the 
0.05 level. The linear age-at-IPO log variable is negative (ß = -9.023, p < 0.05), whereas the 
quadratic variable is positive (ß = 0.974, p < 0.05). Therefore, a U-shaped relationship 
between firm age-at-IPO and post-IPO stock performance exists for Internet companies as 





Figure 4: U-shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and excess returns 
The equation of regression model 4A that describes the U-shaped relationship between Age-
at-IPO log and Excess log return is shown below.13 
 





The negative coefficient of the linear age-at-IPO term makes the regression line downward 
sloping initially. By setting the first derivative of the equation equal to zero, I find that the 
minimum of the slope is at Age-at-IPO log of 4.63 (approximately 102 months/ 8.5 years).14 
The representing expected excess log return at this point is -81.6%. After the minimum point, 
the curve is upward sloping, indicating that firms older than 8.5 years, on average, start 
                                                 
13 This formula does not include the control variables, but as their coefficients are very close to zero and 
statistically insignificant, I omit them in the equation. 
14 The first derivative of the equation gives the slope of the curve: 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
= −9.023 + 1.948𝑥. Setting the 
















performing better again. Other expected values for excess log returns from regression model 
4A can be obtained from table 6 below. The table also shows conversions of the values for 
age-at-IPO log into the original age-at-IPO values given in months.  
Table 6: Expected excess log returns from regression model 4A 
Age-at-IPO log 3.25 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.75 6.00 
Age-at-IPO 25.8 33.1 42.5 54.6 70.1 90.0 115.6 148.4 190.6 244.7 314.2 403.4 
Excess log return 1.04 0.43 -0.06 -0.43 -0.67 -0.80 -0.80 -0.68 -0.44 -0.08 0.40 1.01 
  
Model 4A has an overall p-value of 0.06 (F-statistic = 2.338) and an R-squared of 7.8%. 
Even though the individual regression coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level, the overall model is only significant at the 0.10 level (p = 0.06). 
The relationship between profitability in the year of the IPO and the 5-year post-IPO 
performance of Internet companies is investigated with log-linear model 5A. As predicted in 
hypothesis H3, I find a significant positive relationship between profit margin in the year of 
the IPO and 5-year post-IPO excess returns. The regression coefficient of the independent 
variable Profit margin has a value of 1.151 (SE = 0.479) and is statistically significant (p < 
0.05). Thus, holding all else equal, a 1% increase in profit margin is associated with a 1.151% 
increase in excess log returns.15 Also, model 5A is significant with an F-statistic of 3.111 (2 
degrees of freedom) and a p-value of 0.029. The model is not only significant, but also has a 
relatively high R-squared of 7.7%.  
Model 6A combines models 4A and 5A and thus includes three independent variables: Age-
at-IPO log, Age-at-IPO log squared and Profit margin. All of these variables are significant 
at the 95% confidence level, which provides evidence for hypothesis H1 and hypothesis H3. 
                                                 
15 To calculate the exact change in the non-log-transformed dependent for a one-unit change in the independent 
variable in log-linear models, one needs to calculate 𝑒ß (Benoit, 2011). To calculate the 1% change, the formula 
is 𝑒0.01∗ß. Thus, when Profit margin increases by 1%, holding all else equal, Excess return increases by 1.158%. 
 
31 
Model 6A shows the highest significance of all models (p = 0.019) and has the highest value 
for goodness of fit with an R-squared of 11.4%. This means that the independent variables in 
model 6A explain 11.4% of the variability in the dependent variable Excess log return.16  
Surprisingly, none of the control variables in the model is highly significant, which means 
that firm size does not relate to post-IPO performance in the Internet sector. This is 
contrasting past research on firms in general (Hensler et al., 1997). Regarding Employees this 
finding is intuitive since Internet companies are generally less asset-heavy, including human 
resources (Not & Parker, 2005). The result concerning Revenues could indicate that for 
Internet firms, post-IPO growth is more important than pre-IPO sales (Eisenmann, 2006). 
Overall, the results of the linear regression analyses provide evidence that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between firm age-at-IPO and the 5-year post-IPO performance of Internet 
companies. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 is supported. Furthermore, I find that Internet firms’ 
profit margins in the year of the IPO are positively associated with the 5-year post-IPO 
performance. Thus, hypothesis H3 is also supported.  
5.3 Binary logistic regression 
I use binary logistic regression models in order to assess the hypothesized relationship 
between the independent variables Age-at-IPO (hypothesis H2) and Profit margin 
(hypothesis H4) and the binary dependent variable Survival. Furthermore, the hypothesized 
moderation effect of Profit margin (hypothesis H5) on the relationship between age-at-IPO 
and Internet firm survival is tested. Table 6 provides an overview of the results from six 
different binary logistic regression models. 
                                                 
16 This study does not aim at predicting the dependent variable, but rather it aims at explaining the relationship 
between independent and dependent variables. Thus, the R-squared is not my primary focus when analyzing the 
models. Nevertheless, a high R-square is still desirable and indicates that the independent variables are useful to 
explain the variation in the dependent variable (Pallant, 2013).  
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Table 7: Results of binary logistic regression models 
Dependent variable: Survival 
  Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B Model 4B Model 5B Model 6B 
Constant 0.239 -0.002 16.572* 1.012 0.366 0.200 
 
(1.086) (4.142) (9.243) (0.680) (1.131) (1.156) 
Age-at-IPO 0.006 
 




(0.194)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Age-at-IPO² 
   
0.002*  
  















   
1.112 1.132 6.550 
    
(1.050) (1.033) (5.432) 
Profit margin*Age-at-IPO 








Employees 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Log Likelihood 58.703 59.154 51.818 58.051 57.476 56.203 
Cox & Snell R-squared 0.078 0.074 0.131 0.083 0.088 0.098 
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.176 0.168 0.295 0.187 0.198 0.220 
Omnibus Tests of Model 
Coefficients 
9.429 8.979 16.314 10.081 10.656 11.929 
P-value 0.024 0.030 0.003 0.018 0.031 0.036 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 7.740 18.090 4.441 7.321 2.839 4.470 
P-value 0.459 0.021 0.815 0.502 0.944 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.10 level   
 
Model 1B and 2B investigate whether a linear relationship between age-at-IPO and 5-year 
post-IPO survival exists for Internet companies. Both models pass the Omnibus Tests of 
Model Coefficients (p < 0.05), indicating the overall goodness of fit for the model (Pallant, 
2013). Nevertheless, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test does not support model 2B.17 When 
looking at the regression coefficients of model 1B and 2B, it becomes apparent that none of 
                                                 
17 The Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test indicates poor fit of the model when it is significant (p < 0.05), 
whereas the Omnibus Tests are significant when the model fits well (Pallant, 2013).  
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the independent variables in the model are significant. Thus, a linear relationship between 
age-at-IPO and 5-year post-IPO firm survival does not exist for the sample. Consequently, 
hypothesis H2 is not supported.  
Model 3B adds a quadratic age-at-IPO term to model 1B to test for a U-shaped relationship 
between Age-at-IPO and Survival. This follows from the evidence found for the dependent 
variable Excess log return (hypothesis H1) that was tested with the linear regression model 
1A. In fact, model 3B shows improvements with the independent variables being significant 
at the 0.10 level. The regression coefficient of the linear age-at-IPO term is negative (ß = -
0.336, p < 0.10), whereas the squared age-at-IPO term is positive (ß = 0.002, p < 0.10). 
Model 3B has a highly significant result for the Omnibus Tests (p = 0.003) and insignificance 
for the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (p = 0.815). The Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke R-squared 
values indicate that between 13.1% and 29.5% of the variability in post-IPO firm survival is 
explained by the model, which is the highest range of all binary regression models that I 
conducted.  
Overall, the findings indicate that rather than the predicted negative linear relationship 
between age-at-IPO and post-IPO survival, there is a U-shaped relationship with Internet 
firms in the medium age-at-IPO range being most likely to fail. This is contradicting the 
academic literature, where most authors find evidence that age-at-IPO is associated positively 
with aftermarket survival (Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). The 
upward-sloping part of the U-shape is thus easily explained through previous studies. Still, 
the authors stated explicitly that young firms are more likely to fail since they inhibit a higher 
risk (Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Ritter, 1991). Nevertheless, past 
research does not focus on Internet companies in particular. As discussed previously, many 
Internet firms are part of winner-takes-all markets where being a first-mover on the stock 
market actually increases the chances of survival (Engelmann, 2006; Noe & Parker, 2005).  
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Model 4B assesses the relationship between the independent variable Profit margin and the 
dependent variable Survival. Hypothesis H4 predicts that a positive relationship exists, which 
would imply that firms with higher profitability in the IPO year are more likely to survive in 
the long term. Even though the variable’s regression coefficient is positive, it is not 
statistically significant (ß = 1.112, p > 0.05). Also in model 5B, profit margin is not 
significant (ß = 1.132, p > 0.05). Consequently, hypothesis H4 is not supported.  
Model 6B tests for a moderation effect of Profit margin on the relationship between Age-at-
IPO and Survival. Therefore, the interaction variable Profit margin*Age-at-IPO is added to 
model 5B. The coefficient for Age-at-IPO in this model is 0.008, which means that for every 
additional month of age-at-IPO, the likelihood of survival increases by 0.8%. The coefficient 
of the interaction variable is negative (-0.059), which would indicate that profitability 
decreases the strength of the relationship between Age-at-IPO and Survival as predicted. 
Nevertheless, none of the coefficients in this model are significant and thus, there is no 
evidence for a moderation effect. Therefore, insufficient support is found for hypothesis H5.  
As in the linear regression models of section 5.2, the control variables are not significant for 
any of the models. This further suggests that for Internet companies, size in the year of the 
IPO is not associated significantly with post-IPO performance, in particular firm survival.  
5.4 Quintile analysis 
In order to validate previous findings, I conduct an analysis of age-at-IPO quintiles as 
suggested by Clark (2002). Table 5 shows that the youngest quintile (28-71 months) and the 
oldest quintile at IPO (138-317 months) have the best post-IPO performance overall with 
average excess returns of 68.39% and 37.06% respectively. Firms in the second quintile (72-
92 months) have the lowest average stock performance in the five years after going public 
with an average 5-year post-IPO excess return of -29.16%.  
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When looking at the average excess log returns in table 5, which are used as the primary 
measure of long-term performance in this study, the same pattern is evident. Quintile 1 and 2 
have the highest average excess log returns with 8.63% and -0.18% respectively. On the 
opposite side, quintiles 3 and 4 show the worst performance with -93.03% and -90.19% 
average excess log returns. The average excess log return of quintile 3 (-90.19%) is much 
lower relatively to its average excess return (15.02%). As period holding returns of individual 
stocks can have a minimum value of -100%, whereas there is no theoretical maximum, 
average excess returns are highly influenced by large positive returns above 100%. Through 
the log-transformation of excess returns, the magnitude of companies with very good 
performance is decreased and more emphasis is on firms that perform badly (Hudson & 
Gregoriou, 2015). Evidently, in the third quintile, there are more firms with negative holding 
period returns than in other quintiles, which makes the log-transformed values worse.18  
Table 8: Long-term performance of age-at-IPO quintiles 
Quintile Number of 
firms 










1 22 28-71 68.39% 8.63% 21 95.45% 
2 24 72-92 -29.16% -93.03% 20 83.33% 
3 23 93-112 15.02% -90.19% 20 86.96% 
4 24 113-137 5.27% -36.29% 22 91.67% 
5 23 138-317 37.06% -0.18% 23 100% 
TOTAL 116 115.53 18.35% -43.04% 106 91.34% 
 
These findings confirm the evidence presented from linear regression models and they are in 
line with hypothesis H1, which predicts a U-shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and the 
post-IPO performance. Figure 4 illustrates this relationship.  
                                                 
18 For a detailed overview of observations for age-at-IPO and excess log returns see the scatterplots in Appendix 
D and E. Low average excess log returns of firms with an age of 80 to 120 months stand out in Appendix D. 
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 Figure 5: Excess (log) return per quintile of age-at-IPO 
Furthermore, I conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)19 in order to analyze 
whether the differences between the five groups with respect to average excess log returns 
are statistically significant. Overall, the analysis shows that the groups differ significantly at 
the 0.05 level.20 Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, which assesses if the variance in 
scores is equal for each group, shows a significance level of 0.001 (Pallant, 2013). This 
means that the homogeneity of variance assumption is violated (Pallant, 2013). Therefore, I 
consult the Robust Tests of Equality of Means as suggested by Pallant (2013).21 Both, the 
Welch and the Brown-Forsythe test are significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, I find sufficient 
evidence that the quintile groups’ means differ significantly with respect to the variable 
average excess log returns.  
                                                 
19 A one-way ANOVA is used in order to investigate whether more than two groups differ significantly with 
regards to their mean scores of a continuous dependent variable. The test compares the variance between the 
groups to the variance within each group. An F-statistic is calculated through dividing the total variance between 
the groups by the total variance within the groups. Thus, the larger the F-statistic, the more variance exists 
between the different groups as caused by the independent variable (Pallant, 2013). 
20 Detailed results of the ANOVA can be seen in Appendix F. 
21 The two Robust Tests of Equality of Means, Welch and Brown-Forsythe, should be used when the assumption 






























In order to find out which particular quintiles differ significantly, I conducted the post-hoc 
tests Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) and Fisher's Least Significant Difference 
(LSD). Tukey HSD does not show any significant differences between the groups. But 
Fisher’s LSD indicates that there are significant differences between quintiles 1 and 2/3, and 
quintiles 5 and 2/3. This provides evidence that the above-average performance of Internet 
firms in the youngest and the oldest quintile is significant and that companies with average 
age-at-IPO in quintile 2 and 3 perform significantly worse.  
The quintile groups do not only differ in terms of average excess (log) returns, but also show 
different percentages of firms surviving the five years after going public (see table 7). As 
explained by the binary logistic regression model 3B in section 5.3, firms in the medium age 
ranges have the lowest survival rate. In the oldest quintile (age-at-IPO > 137 months) all 
firms survive, which is in line with past academic literature. Several authors present evidence 
that older firms that go public are less risky and have a lower chance of failure (Engelen & 
van Essen, 2010; Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Ritter, 1991). Nevertheless, authors have also 
highlighted that young companies inhibit a higher risk and are thus more likely to exit in the 
long run (Clark, 2002; Engelen & van Essen, 2010). In the sample of this study, only one of 
the Internet firms that were younger than 72 months (6 years) at the initial offering did not 
survive the 5-year post-IPO period.  
In order to analyze whether the differences between the quintiles with regards to post-IPO 
firm survival are statistically significant, I use a Chi-square test for independence.22 The Chi-
square test statistic shows a value of 5.180 with 4 degrees of freedom.23 This test statistic 
results in a p-value of 0.269, which means that the differences between the groups are not 
                                                 
22 The Chi-square test for independence is used when the relationship between two categorical variables is 
explored. The test compares the observed frequencies in each category to the values that are expected if there 
would be no relationship between the variables under investigation (Pallant, 2013). 
23 The SPSS outputs of the Chi-square test can be seen in Appendix G. 
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statistically significant. Furthermore, the criterion of expected values higher than 5 (Pallant, 
2013) is not fulfilled. This is due to the overall low number of companies that do not survive. 
Due to the failed criterion of values greater than 5, I also consult the more precise alternative 
test, Fisher’s Exact Test, which is also highly insignificant (Pallant, 2013).24 
Overall, the analysis of age-at-IPO quintiles underlines previous findings: Internet companies 
with low age-at-IPO and those with high age-at-IPO perform better in the long run. Internet 
firms that need 72 to 112 months (6 to 9.33 years) from date of incorporation until initial 
public offering show the worst average post-IPO performance. When looking at the long-
term survival of Internet companies, no statistically significant conclusions can be drawn.  
5.5 Robustness tests 
Throughout the data analysis, I have applied several measures to ensure robust results and 
validated findings. I used logarithmic stock returns and the natural logarithm of age-at-IPO in 
order to standardize the data and to exclude outliers. Furthermore, I tested several different 
regression models and presented the results of each model. Still, further robustness tests have 
been conducted. 
As discussed in section 4.1, Internet companies are not easily classified. Companies that were 
actually founded before the existence of the Internet can only be considered as such after they 
started providing new additional services and products or by readjusting their business model. 
This might influence the results of this study since the true nature of some companies might 
not be represented by the original date of incorporation. Therefore, I exclude all companies 
from the sample that were founded before the 1990s, as this was the century when the 
Internet started to be used in the commercial space (Chang, 2004; Zacharakis et al., 2003).  
                                                 
24 Fisher’s Exact Test has to be used when the Chi-square test does not meet the criterion of (at least 80%) 
expected values above 5 (Pallant, 2013). 
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In fact, ten companies in the sample were incorporated before 1990 and are consequently 
excluded in this linear regression. Again, as in section 5.2, I use Excess log return as the 
dependent and Age-at-IPO, as well as its squared term, as independent variables. The model 
is still significant, but the predictor variables are now only significant at the 0.10 level. This 
indicates that these very mature companies that adjusted their business models after the rise 
of the Internet have significant influence on the results. Still, a U-shaped relationship between 
age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance exists since the regression coefficients are slightly 
significant. 
The scatterplot in Appendix E shows three negative outliers with excess log returns of more 
than -500%. As these outliers are part of the medium-aged Internet companies, I exclude 
them from the analysis to observe whether they affect the results. The linear regression 
without the excluded firms still indicates a significant U-shaped relationship between age-at-
IPO and post-IPO excess log returns. The model is significant at the 0.10 level and the 
regression coefficients of Age-at-IPO log and its squared term are significant at the 0.05 
level. Thus, I provide further evidence that a U-shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and 
post-IPO performance exists for Internet firms. Table 8 summarizes the results of this thesis. 
Table 9: Summary of results 
Hypothesis Dependent variable Explanatory variables Test Outcome 
H1 Excess log returns 
Age-at-IPO (log) Linear regression Supported 
Age-at-IPO (Quintiles) Analysis of variance  Supported 
H2 Survival 
Age-at-IPO (log) Binary logistic regression Not supported 
Age-at-IPO (Quintiles) Chi-square of independence Not supported 
H3 Excess log returns Profit margin Linear regression Supported 
H4 Survival Profit margin Binary logistic regression Not supported 
H5 Survival 
Age-at-IPO & Profit 
margin (mediation) 





In this final chapter of the thesis, I will summarize the main findings, compare them to the 
proposed hypotheses and relate the results to both, academic literature and business practice. 
First, I give an overview of the theoretical contributions of this study. Second, practical 
implications are presented. Third, I outline several limitations of this thesis and make 
suggestions for future research. The last section concludes this study. 
6.1 Theoretical contributions 
Academic scholars have found contradicting evidence regarding the relationship between 
age-at-IPO and the long-term performance of companies. Some authors find that older 
companies that go public perform better in the long run and are less likely to fail (Ritter, 
1991; van der Goot et al., 2009; Wagner & Cockburn, 2010). Others do not find significant 
results (Kim & Heshmati, 2010), whereas some even find that there is a negative relationship 
between firm time-to-IPO and post-IPO performance (Andriansyah & Messinis, 2016; 
Banerjee et al., 2016; Clark, 2002). This thesis adds to the existing research by providing 
insights on Internet IPOs in the post-dot-com-bubble period from 2003 to 2010.  
For these particular firms an alternative view, contrasting previous research, is offered 
regarding the relationship between firm age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance. I find 
evidence for a U-shaped relationship, which indicates that very young companies and older 
companies show the best performance in the five years after the IPO. Thus, I provide an 
alternative to past research. Still, my findings incorporate many elements of existing theories. 
Mainly, young companies in the Internet sector (age-at-IPO < 6 years) that achieve an IPO 
gain can finance further growth and attain a competitive position in the market. Furthermore, 
common WTA Internet markets often leave first-movers with a long-term competitive 
advantage and even monopoly positions. Older Internet companies (age-at-IPO > 10 years) 
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benefit from learning effects and have already maintained a competitive market position 
previously even without being publicly funded. A possible explanation for the overall 
underperformance of medium-aged Internet companies that go public (approximately 6-10 
years) is that they are neither the outstanding first-movers, nor the solid incumbents with a 
lasting competitive advantage. Often, the management of these firms might either wait for the 
market to provide higher valuations or they push the company to market quicker than 
strategically rational because of pressure from impatient investors and founders. 
Further, in line with past research, I find that profitability in the year of the IPO is positively 
associated with 5-year post-IPO performance. Even though Internet businesses have a lot of 
growth potential, traditional accounting measures should not be neglected, which is in line 
with Bhattacharya et al. (2010). Profitability is a sign for the long-term viability of a business. 
Thus it makes intuitive sense that a positive relationship with long-term performance exists. 
Surprisingly, there is no significant relationship found between age-at-IPO/ profitability and 
the long-term survival of Internet companies. This contrasts existing research that provides 
evidence for a positive relationship between firm age-at-IPO and survival (Engelen & van 
Essen, 2010; Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Ritter, 1991). One reason is the overall low number of 
exits in the sample. Furthermore, after the dot-com bust, investors were skeptical and the 
Internet sector has become more mature. This led to a careful selection of IPOs and 
emasculated the over-ambitious growth expectations that existed during the years of the 
bubble. Thus, this study adds to the existing literature on Internet companies and makes the 
discussion more recent. 
Overall, surprisingly little research has been conducted so far regarding the relationship 
between firm age-at-IPO and post-IPO performance. Even though several authors (Banerjee 
et al., 2016; Clark, 2002; Kim & Heshmati, 2010; Ritter, 1991; Wagner & Cockburn, 2010) 
investigated the effect of age-at-IPO on post-IPO performance, they did so for firms in 
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general. By focusing on Internet ventures, this research adds significant value, particularly 
because Internet companies have distinguishing characteristics, such as enormous growth 
potential and great volatility (Johnston & Madura, 2002). So far, studies on the relationship 
between firm age-at-IPO and aftermarket performance looked at 3-year post-IPO 
performance (Clark, 2002; Kim and Heshmati, 2010), whereas this research investigates a 
time horizon of five years after going public. Thus, the long-term focus of this study allows 
for more insights on the relationship between age-at-IPO and performance. This is very 
interesting in the relatively young domain of Internet ventures. The long-term viability of 
Internet business models is an often-debated topic and besides growth, a sustainable 
performance is more and more in the focus of attention. Thus, this research contributes 
significantly to the discussions around the sustainability of Internet ventures. 
6.2 Practical implications 
This thesis sets the focus of managers and investors towards the long-term implications of 
Internet IPOs. As Gill & Walz (2016, p. 357) argue, “going public is one of the most 
important corporate governance decisions in a firm’s lifetime”. It is therefore a key strategic 
decision that does not only provide a company with funds, but also comes with liabilities 
such as more detailed reporting and the influence of institutional investors. This is especially 
important in the Internet sector, where oftentimes hype and general market conditions have 
determined the actions of companies and investors.  
In general, the finding that both young and old Internet IPOs are most successful on average 
makes a concrete investment recommendation challenging. Nevertheless, it becomes obvious 
that what matters is how the Internet company is strategically positioned in the market. 
Investors should therefore carefully analyze the conditions in the respective market niche 
instead of throwing money at companies during hot IPO markets. It might be that an old 
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company with low external investments proves financial sustainability for a long time in a 
niche market. Through an initial public offering it could extend its position and gain further 
stakes in related markets. Very young companies on the other hand might present less risk to 
investors than usually assumed. When a young Internet firm is a first-mover and has the 
chance to dominate a WTA market for example, it might be a great target for investments and 
the risk of failure might be actually low.  
The enormous scalability that comes with the World Wide Web and the existence of WTA 
markets made growth the Holy Grail for Internet firms. Still, other measures of corporate 
performance should be equally relevant to investors in this sector. The significant relationship 
between profitability and post-IPO performance, which was found in this study, indicates that 
Internet companies need to show signs of long-term financial viability in order to prosper. 
Profitability certainly is one of those signs (Jain et al., 2008). In the long-term, a company 
should make profits and provide returns to its shareholders. This can only happen if it 
generates positive cash flows from operations in the long term.  
6.3 Limitations and future research 
Even though, I have conducted a robust empirical study, several limitations have to be 
revealed. First, I simply carried forward the last stock prices of companies that had a delisting 
during the five years after the IPO. Thus, it happens that for some companies, only two years 
of true performance are obtained. This might affect the results slightly, especially since 
general market conditions are heavily influencing the stock prices of Internet firms.  
Furthermore, I did not control explicitly for hot market conditions and crises, which would be 
an important measure to test the reasons for underperformance of medium-aged Internet 
IPOs. The only way that I account for market conditions, such as the 2008 financial crisis, is 
by calculating excess returns above the market index. 
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One of the main arguments for the, on average, superior performance of young companies is 
the existence of winner-takes-all (WTA) Internet markets where only one firm attains a 
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, I do not analyze the markets of all firms in the sample 
in order to validate this reasoning further. Future studies should thus review the respective 
markets of the firms in the sample to investigate the effect of WTA markets on the superior 
performance of quick Internet IPOs. 
The lack of significant findings for the dependent variable Survival is partially due to the fact 
that only 10 out of the 116 companies in the sample had an exit, which equals 8.6%. Thus, 
the prediction of firm survival through the constructed regression models is not better than 
predicting that all companies would survive. Taking a larger sample might therefore be 
helpful in order to investigate this relationship meaningfully. Including companies from the 
New York Stock Exchange or even exchanges from other countries are examples of valid 
options to enlarge the sample. 
Even though it is evident that firm size might impact the post-IPO performance, it has to be 
noted that the control variables number of employees and revenues, which I use in all 
regression models, are not significant. This is surprising and it might be wise to include 
another control variable in future studies. For example, the amount of venture capital 
investments prior to the IPO might be an interesting indicator for Internet firms that future 
research should take into account.  
Last, Internet companies are still broadly defined in this thesis. Since Internet-based business 
models can be vastly distinct, it is interesting to separate future samples into different kinds 
of Internet firms, e.g. e-commerce, social media, advertising and software infrastructure. All 
these types have very different characteristics, e.g. regarding first-mover advantages and 
network effects. A distinction between business-to-consumer and business-to-business 




This thesis provides evidence for a U-shaped relationship between age-at-IPO and 5-year 
post-IPO stock performance for Internet companies. This implies that Internet firms with low 
age-at-IPO and high age-at-IPO perform better in the long run than their medium-aged 
counterparts. Older companies that go public mainly benefit from learning effects and already 
have a solid positioning in the market even though they were not publicly funded yet. This is 
in line with most research that suggests that age-at-IPO is positively associated with long-
term stock performance. The main explanation for young companies performing well is that 
they can grow quickly with the acquired cash from an IPO and attain first-mover advantages 
in their respective market. This is especially important in winner-takes-all Internet markets, 
which is a main reason for the novelty of this outcome in this particular study. Furthermore, 
an Internet company with a quick IPO usually obtained large amounts of venture capital 
funding because investors believe in its superior business model. For these high-potential 
first-movers, the costs of delaying the IPO is likely to be higher than the benefits from 
learning effects or higher market valuations over time. 
Additionally, as hypothesized, I have shown that profitability in the year of the IPO is 
positively associated with the long-term stock performance of Internet companies. A 
company that is profitable shows long-term viability and thus, on average, is more likely to 
perform better. This finding is important as it adds to the ongoing debate around the 
sustainability of Internet companies, which are still often associated with overvalued growth 
opportunities and hyped IPOs despite significant losses at the bottom line. Also, it shows that 
traditional accounting metrics still apply for the Internet sector. 
Above all, I conclude that managers and investors should mainly emphasize the strategic 
implications of an IPO, which has an impact on future investment capabilities, internal 
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Appendix B: Sample  
1 51Job 40 Fortinet 79 Phase Forward  
2 Acme Packet 41 Global Defense Technology & 
Systems  
80 PlanetOut  
3 Airvana  42 Glu Mobile  81 PowerDsine Ltd. 
4 Allot Communications 43 Gravity 82 Provide Commerce 
5 Alphabet 44 Greenfield Online  83 Qlik Technologies  
6 American Public Ed. 45 Guidance Software  84 Quinstreet  
7 Ancestry.Com  46 Interactive Brokers  85 Realpage  
8 Archipelago Learning  47 Internet Brands  86 RightNow Technologies  
9 Arcsight  48 Ipass 87 RigNet 
10 Athenahealth 49 Isilon Systems  88 Sajan 
11 Baidu  50 Kanbay International  89 Salary.Com  
12 Blackbaud  51 Kingtone Wirelessinfo 
Solution Holding Ltd 
90 Shanda Interactive 
Entertainment Ltd. 
13 Blackboard 52 Knology 91 Shoretel  
14 Blue Nile   53 Kongzhong Corp. 92 Shutterfly  
15 Bofi Holding 54 Limelight Networks  93 Sirf Technology Holdings  
16 Bridgeline Digital 55 Liquidity Services 94 Sito Mobile 
17 Broadcom Limited 56 Logmein 95 Sky-Mobi Limited 
18 Broadsoft  57 Loopnet  96 Smartpros 
19 Callidus Software  58 Makemytrip 97 Soundbite Communications  
20 Capella Education 59 Marchex  98 Sourcefire 
21 Changyou.Com Limited 60 Marketaxess Holdings  99 SPS Commerce 
22 China Finance Online 61 Medassets  100 SS&C Technologies Holdings 
23 Chinacache International 
Holdings Ltd. 
62 Medecision  101 Starent Networks Corporation 
24 Cimpress 63 Mediamind Technologies  102 Synchronoss Technologies 
25 Commvault Systems  64 Medidata Solutions 103 Taleo Corporation 
26 Comscore 65 Mercadolibre 104 TechTarget 
27 Comverge  66 Monotype Imaging Holdings  105 Telenav 
28 Convio  67 Morningstar  106 Traffic.Com 
29 Copsync 68 NCI 107 US Auto Parts Network 
30 Ctrip Com International Ltd. 69 Netsol Technologies Ltd 108 Virtual Radiologic 
Corporation 
31 Dealertrack Holdings  70 Ninetowns 109 Virtusa Corporation 
32 Deltek 71 Odimo 110 Visual Sciences 
33 Demandtec  72 Omniture  111 Vitacost.com 
34 Digimarc 73 Open Solutions  112 Vocus 
35 Divx  74 Opentable  113 Voltari 
36 eCOST.com  75 OptionsXpress Holdings 114 Web.Com Group 
37 eFuture Holding 76 Orbitz  115 WebMD Health 
38 EHealth 77 Palmsource  116 Xyratex 
39 Expedia  78 Perion Network   
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Appendix D: Scatterplot of age-at-IPO vs. excess log returns  
 


















































Appendix F: ANOVA outputs for age-at-IPO quintiles 
ANOVA 
      
Variable  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-
statistic 
Sig. 
Excess log return Between Groups 21.318 4 5.329 2.633 0.038 
 Within Groups 224.68 111 2.024   
 Total 245.998 115    
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances   
Variable Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Excess log return 4.913 4 111 0.001 
 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means    
Variable Test Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Excess log return Welch 2.622 4 54.188 0.045 
 Brown-Forsythe 2.649 4 74.665 0.04 
 
Descriptives         
Variable Quintile N Mean SD SE 95% Confidence Interval for Mean Min. Max. 
      Lower Bound Upper Bound   
Excess log 
return 
1 22 0.086 1.011 0.216 -0.362 0.535 -1.738 2.326 
2 24 -0.930 1.697 0.346 -1.647 -0.214 -6.763 0.887 
3 23 -0.902 2.090 0.436 -1.806 0.002 -5.587 1.550 
 4 24 -0.363 1.107 0.226 -0.830 0.104 -3.534 0.974 
 5 23 -0.002 0.760 0.159 -0.331 0.327 -1.967 0.897 




Multiple Comparisons       
Dependent Variable (I) Quintile (J) Quintile Mean Difference (I-J) SE Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 




1 2 1.017 0.420 0.117 -0.148 2.181 
 3 0.988 0.424 0.143 -0.188 2.165 
 4 0.449 0.420 0.822 -0.715 1.614 
 5 0.088 0.424 1.000 -1.088 1.265 
2 1 -1.017 0.420 0.117 -2.181 0.148 
  3 -0.028 0.415 1.000 -1.180 1.123 
  4 -0.567 0.411 0.641 -1.706 0.572 
  5 -0.928 0.415 0.174 -2.080 0.223 
 3 1 -0.988 0.424 0.143 -2.165 0.188 
  2 0.028 0.415 1.000 -1.123 1.180 
  4 -0.539 0.415 0.693 -1.690 0.612 
  5 -0.900 0.420 0.209 -2.064 0.263 
 4 1 -0.449 0.420 0.822 -1.614 0.715 
  2 0.567 0.411 0.641 -0.572 1.706 
  3 0.539 0.415 0.693 -0.612 1.690 
  5 -0.361 0.415 0.907 -1.512 0.790 
 5 1 -0.088 0.424 1.000 -1.265 1.088 
  2 0.928 0.415 0.174 -0.223 2.080 
  3 0.900 0.420 0.209 -0.263 2.064 
  4 0.361 0.415 0.907 -0.790 1.512 
LSD (Fisher's Least 
Significant 
Difference)  
1 2 1.017* 0.420 0.017 0.184 1.849 
 3 0.988* 0.424 0.022 0.147 1.829 
 4 0.449 0.420 0.287 -0.383 1.281 
 5 0.088 0.424 0.836 -0.753 0.929 
 2 1 -1.017* 0.420 0.017 -1.849 -0.184 
  3 -0.028 0.415 0.946 -0.851 0.794 
  4 -0.567 0.411 0.17 -1.381 0.246 
  5 -0.928* 0.415 0.027 -1.751 -0.106 
 3 1 -0.988* 0.424 0.022 -1.829 -0.147 
  2 0.028 0.415 0.946 -0.794 0.851 
  4 -0.539 0.415 0.197 -1.362 0.284 
  5 -0.900* 0.420 0.034 -1.731 -0.069 
 4 1 -0.449 0.420 0.287 -1.281 0.383 
  2 0.567 0.411 0.17 -0.246 1.381 
  3 0.539 0.415 0.197 -0.284 1.362 
  5 -0.361 0.415 0.386 -1.184 0.462 
 5 1 -0.088 0.424 0.836 -0.929 0.753 
  2 0.928* 0.415 0.027 0.106 1.751 
  3 0.900* 0.420 0.034 0.069 1.731 
  4 0.361 0.415 0.386 -0.462 1.184 








Appendix G: Chi-square outputs for age-at-IPO quintiles 
Crosstabulation: Quintile Group of Age-at-IPO * Survival    
Quintile  Exit Survival Total 
1 Count 1 21 22 
 Expected Count 1.9 20.1 22 
2 Count 4 20 24 
 Expected Count 2.1 21.9 24 
3 Count 3 20 23 
 Expected Count 2 21 23 
4 Count 2 22 24 
 Expected Count 2.1 21.9 24 
5 Count 0 23 23 
 Expected Count 2 21 23 
Total Count 10 106 116 
 Expected Count 10 106 116 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.180a 4 0.269 
Likelihood Ratio 6.789 4 0.147 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.961 1 0.327 
N of Valid Cases 116    
a. 5 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.90. 
 
